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because the lower after-tax rate of return re-
duces the rental cost of holding durable goods.
Then, if there is no tax on the service flow
from such goods, they gain a relative price
advantage over nondurables, causing the dis-
tortion. Harberger (1966) and Shoven (1976)
focus exclusively on the static excess burden
due to resource reallocations in production
arising from sector-level differences in capital
income taxation. The literature seems to lack
comparisons of the static and intertemporal
distortions in consumption that arise from a
capital income tax.
A number of studies recommend eliminating
the capital income tax in order to avoid the
welfare loss it causes. Some tax reform plans
that call for a shift to a flat tax on wages share
this motivation. However, these proposals have
been criticized for their probable impact on
equity. If they are deemed undesirable because
of equity or other considerations, it may never-
theless be possible and desirable to devise tax
policies for reducing or eliminating the static
component of the welfare loss. Hence, under-
standing the absolute and relative magnitudes
of the two components of welfare loss resulting
from capital income taxation is important for
Introduction
In most countries, the pecuniary return from
holding financial assets is taxed because capital
income is included in the income tax base. A
capital income tax reduces the after-tax rate of
return on saving, making future consumption
costlier than consuming today. That is, it dis-
torts consumer choice along the “intertempo-
ral” margin. Several studies have investigated
the impact of capital income taxation on house-
hold saving decisions and evaluated the con-
sequent welfare loss (for example, Levhari and
Sheshinski [1972], Feldstein [1978], Chamley
[1981], Auerbach, Kotlikoff, and Skinner [1983],
and Auerbach [1989]).
However, it is also true that the service flow
from holding durable goods like cars, houses,
or boats is usually not included in the income
tax base, partly because such income is hard to
impute. An often underappreciated fact is that
with a capital income tax, excluding the im-
puted value of durable goods’ service flows
from the tax base produces a second, “static”
distortion of consumer choice, namely, that
between consuming durable and nondurable
goods within a period. This distortion occurs
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obtained for the three compensated tax schemes
from computations based on a 60-period time
horizon, and also examines the sensitivity of the
excess burdens to changes in various parame-
ters. Section VII summarizes and concludes.
I. A Simple Model 
of Consumption
The consumer is assumed to live for T periods
and to maximize a time-separable lifetime util-
ity function given by
where ut is given by the CES form:
Consumption of the nondurable good in
period t is denoted by Nt, and the stock of the
durable good is denoted by St. We assume that
the service flow (consumption) from durable
goods is proportional to the stock held. Hence,
we interpret u as the product of within-period
intensity of preference for the durable good and
the ratio of the flow of the durable good’s serv-
ices to its stock.3  This allows the stock of the
durable good—rather than the flow of services
—to be used as an argument in the utility func-
tion. The parameter g is the intertemporal elas-
ticity of substitution; r is the within-period elas-
ticity of substitution between the nondurable
and the durable good; and b is the rate of time
preference. These parameters are assumed to 
be constant over the consumer’s lifetime.
The maximization of U in equation (1) is
subject to the following budget constraints:
(3)    Dt +1 = St (1 – d) t = 1,...T
(4)     At +1 = [At + W t – Nt – p(St –Dt)](1+r)
t =1,...T
(5) NT + p(ST –DT) # AT +WT
+ pST [(1–d)/(1+r)].
setting tax policy: If the static welfare loss is
large, a case could be made for taxing durable-
goods purchases in order to minimize the total
welfare loss from capital income taxation.
To measure the magnitudes of the excess
burdens attributable to static and intertemporal
distortions, this study uses a representative-
agent, life-cycle model of consumption.1  The
agent’s preferences are represented by a time-
separable utility function with constant elasticity
of substitution (CES) in one durable and one
nondurable good. 
To evaluate the total excess burden and its
two components, we use several compensated
tax and subsidy experiments. In each of them,
we compare the agent’s welfare under the no-
tax case to that under a compensated tax (or
subsidy), where tax (subsidy) revenues are fully
rebated (charged) to the consumer in a nondis-
tortionary (lump-sum) manner. Such a rebate of
tax revenues is necessary to maintain the agent’s
budget constraint at the same level as under the
no-tax case. Then, with a tax, the agent’s con-
sumption choices differ from the no-tax case
only because relative prices of durables and
nondurables today and in the future are differ-
ent, not because the consumer’s overall budget
has changed. To calculate the size of the wel-
fare loss in each case, we measure the percent-
age reduction in the agent’s lifetime budget
under the no-tax case that is necessary to gener-
ate the same loss of utility as under a compen-
sated tax or subsidy.2
The remainder of the paper is organized as
follows: Section I describes a life-cycle model of
consumption with one durable and one non-
durable good. Sections II, III, and IV present the
formulations for three different compensated tax
schemes used to decompose the total excess
burden into its static and intertemporal compo-
nents. Section V uses results from the previous
three sections to show that, under the CES util-
ity specification, the sum of the static and inter-
temporal components of excess burden closely
approximates the total excess burden. Section VI
discusses the magnitudes of the excess burdens
n 1 1 We should clarify two points: First, the analysis focuses exclu-
sively on the distortions from a capital income tax and does not take into
account the fact that mortgage interest on housing is subsidized.  Second,
our study is not conducted within a general equilibrium framework.  Gen-
eral equilibrium feedback effects may alter the final pre- and after-tax inter-
est rates, thereby influencing both components of the excess burden.  
n 2 2 “Lifetime budget” refers to the amount of money (in present
value) necessary to purchase the goods and leisure consumed over one’s
entire lifetime. This gauge of excess burden is known as the “wealth equiv-
alent” measure.
n 3 3 We are indebted to an anonymous referee for pointing out this
interpretation of the parameter u.
(1)   U = 
[1 – (1/g)]
[S(1 + b)(1–t)ut
{1 – (1/g)}], 1
t =1
T
(2)   ut [Nt
{1 – (1/r)} + qSt
{1 – (1/r)}]1/{1 – (1/r)}.
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Now, consider the imposition of a fully com-
pensated capital income tax at rate t, where 
0 < t < 1, which makes the net rate of interest
rn = r (1 – t). We assume that the collection of
revenue from the tax and the compensation
both occur at the end of each period. The life-
time budget constraint applicable to this case is
Here, qn = (rn+ d)/(1 + rn), and Ct stands for
the lump-sum compensation paid back at the
end of period t. Under full compensation, Ct
must equal the revenue collected from the capi-
tal income tax at the end of period t for all 
t = 1,...T. This implies that the budget con-
straint is identical to that under no taxation.4
However, equations (6) and (7) show that the
relative prices of the 2T goods change when the
capital income tax is imposed. Because ¶qn/¶t =
r (1 – d)/(1 + rn)2 < 0, in any given period the
price of consuming the durable good relative to
the nondurable good is lower than the same rel-
ative price in the no-tax case. This represents
the static subsidy to the consumption of the
durable good that is implicit in a capital income
tax. Further, ¶[1/(1+ rn)]/¶t = r/(1 + rn)2 > 0;
that is, the price of consuming either good in
any period t  is lower relative to the price of
consuming the same good in a future period 
t + s, where s $ 1. This represents the intertem-
poral distortion favoring earlier consumption
that a capital income tax introduces.
Using the first-order conditions from maxi-
mizing utility subject to equation (7) and the no-
tax budget constraint (6), one can obtain the in-
direct utility,Vc, under the compensated capital
income tax case: Vc =Vc(p, qn,PVR; r, g, u, d, b). 
n 4 4 This can be demonstrated using a simple two-period example
with one consumption good N. Assume that the consumer lives for two
periods, consumes at the end of both, but earns a wage W only at the end
of period 1. The lifetime budget constraint with no capital income tax is 
N1 + N2 /(1 + r) = W. With a compensated capital income tax, it is 
N1 + N2/[1 + r (1 – t)] = W + C/[1 + r(1 – t)], where C is the compensa-
tion paid at the end of period 2—which is when the tax revenue on the
return on period 1 saving is collected. Note that discounting is now done
using the after-tax rate of interest faced by the consumer. Setting C equal to
the tax collected at the end of period 2, C = (W – N1 )rt, and simplifying
the expression yields the no-tax budget constraint.
In these constraints, At represents financial
assets and Dt is the stock of the durable good
owned by the consumer at the beginning of
period t. The durable good’s rate of deprecia-
tion over one period is given by d, and its rela-
tive price is denoted by p. The consumer is
assumed to receive a wage, W (which we set at
unity), and purchases of the two goods are as-
sumed to occur at the beginning of each period.
The difference, St –D t, thus represents the addi-
tion to the stock of the durable good in period
t. Equations (3) and (4) are asset accumulation
conditions that indicate how consumption
choice in period t affects the portfolio of assets
available at the beginning of period t +1. Equa-
tion (5) is a terminal-asset-value constraint. It
specifies that the total expenditure on the non-
durable good and on the net addition to the
stock of the durable good at the beginning of
the last period cannot exceed the sum of the
financial assets held and wages received at the
beginning of the period plus the discounted
value of the depreciated stock of the durable
good that is assumed to be sold at the end of
the period. The discount rate is given by r.
Successively substituting equations (3) and
(4) for index t into the same equations for in-
dex t +1, for all t where 1 # t # T, yields the
lifetime budget constraint facing the consumer:
where q = (r + d)/(1 + r). In terms of units of
the nondurable good, N, the rental cost of a unit
of the durable good is given by pq; it represents
the cost due to forgone interest and deprecia-
tion incurred by holding a unit of the durable
good for one period. The right side of equation
(6) is the present value of total expenditures on
the two goods over the agent’s lifetime, and the
left side is the present value of resources. Thus
viewed, the intertemporal maximization prob-
lem is isomorphic to a static consumer choice
problem. There are 2T goods with relative
prices that equal their respective coefficients in
equation (6). Using familiar techniques, one
can obtain the indirect utility function associ-
ated with the consumer choice problem
described here—that is, utility expressed as a
function of the relative price of the durable
good, p, its rental cost, q, the present value of
resources, PVR, and other parameters of the
utility function: V = V (p, q, PVR; r, g, u, d, b).
(6)   PVR =   SWt(1 + r)(1–t) =  SNt (1 + r)(1–t)
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Let lc stand for the percentage reduction in
PVR necessary to equate the pre-tax utility, V,
with the post-tax utility,Vc. To obtain the ana-
lytical formula for lc, replace PVR in the ex-
pression for V with PVR(1 + lc), equate the re-
sultant expression to Vc, and solve for lc. The
total welfare loss from a capital income tax can




A measure of the static (within-period) compo-
nent of the excess burden arising from a capital
income tax can be obtained by removing the
tax and replacing it with an equivalent compen-
sated subsidy on the consumption of the dur-
able good. Removing the capital income tax
eliminates both the static and the intertemporal
distortions. However, introducing a compen-
sated subsidy on durables consumption reintro-
duces the static distortion by altering the relative
price of durables vis-à-vis nondurables con-
sumption. The subsidy must be levied at a rate
equal to that implicit in the capital income tax.
This rate of subsidy, s, can be written as
As shown earlier, ¶qn/¶t < 0. Hence, the rate
of subsidy, s, is positive. The lifetime budget
constraint relevant to this case is
Here, Ht is a lump-sum tax levied at the begin-
ning of period t. It serves as a (negative) com-
pensation against s, the subsidy on the con-
sumption of the durable good. There are two
alternative but equivalent ways to view this sub-
sidy. One can think of it as subsidizing either
the rental cost of holding the durable good for
one period or the purchase of new stocks of the
durable good. 
Let ps = p(1 – s) represent the net (post-
subsidy) purchase price of new durable goods.
Using first-order conditions derived from maxi-
mizing utility subject to equation (10), and using
the no-tax budget constraint (6), one can ob-
tain the indirect utility under the compensated
capital income tax case: Vs = Vs (ps, q, PVR; 
r, g, u, d, b).
Following the same procedure as that used
for obtaining lc in equation (8), the excess bur-
den due to the static distortion, ls, can be eval-
uated as
Note that the static excess burden depends on
the elasticity of substitution between durables
and nondurables consumption, r, but not on




To isolate the intertemporal distortion in the
relative price of current versus future consump-
tion resulting from a capital income tax, the
compensated capital income tax is retained
and, in addition, a compensated tax on the
consumption of the durable good is imposed.
Retention of the capital income tax maintains
the static and intertemporal distortions. How-
ever, the additional tax on durables consump-
tion neutralizes the static distortion, leaving
only the intertemporal distortion in place. As in
the previous case, the tax must be levied at a
rate equivalent to the rate of subsidy on dur-
ables consumption that is implicit in the capital
income tax. The equivalent tax rate, m, on the
durable good is given by
{1 + pqn[q/pqn]r}(1/f )











(10)  PVR =  SWt (1 + r)(1 – t) + SHt(1 + r)(1 – t)
=  SNt(1 + r)(1 – t)







(9)   s = 1 –
q
= 1 –    
(r + d)/(1 + r)   
. qn (rn + d)/(1 + rn)
n 5 5 Details of the derivations are available from the authors  
upon request.
(11)  ls = –1.
{1+ pq[q/pq]r}{1+psq[q/psq]r}(1/f )
{1+ pq[q/psq]r}{1+pq[q/pq]r}(1/f )
(12)  m = 
qn
– 1 = 
(rn + d)/(1 + rn)
– 1. q (r + d)/(1 + r)
(8) lc =
{1 + pq[q/pqn]r} 
•
{1 + pq[q/pq]r}(1/f )
•
{S [B/Rn]g(t –1)R (t –1)}
•
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{S [B/Rn]g(t –1)R (t –1)}
•
{S [B/R]g(t –1)R (t –1)}
(1/g)
– 1.
Again, since ¶qn/¶t < 0, the tax rate, m, is posi-
tive. The agent’s lifetime budget constraint now
becomes 
Here, Gt stands for a lump-sum transfer made at
the beginning of each period to compensate for
the tax, m, levied on consumption of the
durable good in each period. Because the capi-
tal income tax is maintained in this case, Ct , the
corresponding end-of-period compensation for
each period t, also enters the budget constraint.
As in the case of the subsidy, the tax on the
durable good can be viewed either as a tax on
the rental cost of holding the good for one
period or as a tax on the purchase of new
stocks of durables.
Let pm = p(1 + m) represent the gross price
of new stocks of durable goods. Following the
same procedure of maximizing utility subject
to the budget constraint (13), and using the
first-order conditions with the no-tax budget
constraint (6), we can obtain the indirect utility
function for this case: Vm = Vm(pm, qn, PVR; 
r, g, u, d, b). Note that pmqn = pq. Hence, the
relative prices of the two goods within any
period are restored to those prevailing under
the no-tax budget constraint (6). 
Using the same procedure as earlier, the
excess burden due to the intertemporal distor-
tion, lm, becomes
Note that lm depends on the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution, g, but not on the
within-period elasticity of substitution between
durables and nondurables consumption, r.
(13)   PVR = S Wt(1+rn)(1–t)




V. Does the Total
Excess Burden Equal
the Sum of Its Parts?
It is possible to show that under the CES specifi-
cation of consumer preferences used here, the
sum of the static and intertemporal components
of excess burden is almost equal to the com-
bined excess burden from a capital income tax.
Rewrite equations (11) and (14) in abbreviated
fashion as ls = (X – 1) and lm = (Y – 1), where
X is the term in equation (11) involving p, ps, 
q, u, and r; andY is the term in equation (14)
involving B, R, Rn, and g. Noting that psq = pqn,
equation (8) can be written as
(15)   lc = (XY – 1).
However, adding equations (11) and (14) in
abbreviated form yields
(16)    ls + lm = (X – 1) + (Y – 1) 
= [(XY – 1) – (X – 1)(Y – 1)] 
= lc – lmls.
Because the product lmls becomes negligibly
small when lm and ls are small, one can con-
clude that the total excess burden from a capi-
tal income tax is closely approximated by the






To obtain the wealth equivalent measure of
excess burden, it is necessary to make assump-
tions about the utility parameters r, g, d, u, and
b, the pre-tax rate of interest r, the relative
price of the durable good p, and the rate of
capital income taxation t. To do this, we select
base-case values for the different utility para-
meters, drawing on the findings of other empir-
ical studies. We then examine the magnitude of
the wealth equivalent measure of excess bur-
den and analyze its sensitivity to changes in dif-
ferent parameters for each of the three com-
pensated tax schemes.
Empirical evidence on the value of r is
sparse. Mankiw’s (1982) study establishes a
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hypothesis that r equals unity cannot be
rejected. For the purposes of this study, the
base-case value is set at unity.
For g, values of 0.28 (Ghez and Becker
[1975]), 0.25 (Grossman and Shiller [1981]), and
< 0.1 (Hall [1988]) have been reported. How-
ever, recent studies analyzing labor–leisure
choices suggest that intertemporal substitution
elasticities are much larger, ranging from 0.3
(Mulligan [1995]) to 0.9 (Rupert, Rogerson, and
Wright [1996]). Therefore, the base-case value
selected for g in our study is 0.5.
The base-case value chosen for u is 2.5,
which makes the expenditure on nondurable
goods and services equal to 40 percent of the
stock of the durable good when the rate of cap-
ital income taxation is 30 percent.6 The base-
case values of both r and b have been set at
0.03. The relative price of the durable good, p,
has been chosen so that the cost of holding one
unit of the durable good for one period equals
the cost of purchasing one unit of the non-
durable good in the no-tax case; that is, pq = 1.
A reasonable depreciation rate on major
durable goods such as housing is 3 percent
annually, but the rate on durable appliances is
much higher. Hence, 0.05 has been used as the
base-case value of d.
Results and
Sensitivity Analysis
The base-case parameters yield values of 0.13
percent for the static component, 0.50 percent
for the intertemporal component, and 0.62 per-
cent for the combined excess burden.7  Thus,
under our chosen base-case values, the total
excess burden due to a capital income tax is
sizable, with the static component about 26
percent as large as the intertemporal compo-
nent. This implies that focusing exclusively on
the intertemporal source of welfare loss would
likely underestimate the welfare loss from a
capital income tax by about 26 percent! 
n 6 6 This parameterization is based on 1994 data on personal con-
sumption expenditures of $4,120 billion and outstanding stock of residen-
tial real estate (housing and land) and consumer durable goods of $9,956
billion. These figures are taken from the Economic Report of the President,
1997, and the Federal Reserve System’s Balance Sheets of the U.S. Econ-
omy, 1945–94. The ratio of nondurable expenditures and durable goods
stock turns out to be 41 percent. Because these figures are based on an
economy with a capital income tax, our calibration of u = 2.5 is made in the
presence of a 30 percent tax rate.
n 7 7 The numbers do not add up because of rounding and because the
sum of the components is greater than the total excess burden. See equa-
tion (16), keeping in mind that ls, lm, and lc are all negative.
F I G U R E 1
Response of Excess Burden 
to Changes in g
g
F I G U R E 2
Response of Excess Burden 
to Changes in r
r
F I G U R E 3
Response of Excess Burden 




Economic Review 1997 Q18
Figures 1 through 6 show the response of
excess burden to changes in various parame-
ters. The numbers plotted represent the per-
centage reduction in PVR required under the
no-tax case to obtain the same utility level as
under the relevant compensated tax/subsidy
scheme. In each instance, all parameters except
the one under consideration are set at their
base-case levels.
Figure 1 shows the response of excess bur-
den to changes in g. The combined excess bur-
den increases from about 0.38 percent to about
0.86 percent when g is raised from 0.25 to 0.75.
As expected, the static component is not re-
sponsive to changes in the value of g. Figure 2
shows that the combined excess burden from a
capital income tax goes from 0.57 percent to
0.65 percent in response to a change in r from
0.5 to 1.5. Again, as expected, the intertemporal
component does not change when the value of
r is altered.
Figure 3 indicates that simultaneously in-
creasing the rates of interest and time prefer-
ence while maintaining equality between them
results in larger excess burdens. However, the
rate of increase of the intertemporal component
is greater than that of the static component. 
The expression for lm (equation [14]) does
not involve d. Hence, the intertemporal compo-
nent is not responsive to changes in the depre-
ciation rate. The static and the combined excess
burdens, on the other hand, are negatively
related to d. This can be shown by differentiat-
ing equation (11) with respect to d:
Figure 4 shows that the combined excess
burden declines from about 0.74 percent to
0.53 percent when d is increased from 0.03 to
0.12. The static component is almost 50 percent
smaller than the intertemporal component for
very low values of d. This implies that the static
distortion could be particularly substantial for
major durable goods (such as housing), which
have low depreciation rates.
Figure 5 plots the responses of the com-
bined excess burden and its components to
changes in the capital income tax rate, t. In
conformity with the rule that excess burdens
increase with the square of the tax rate, the fig-
ure shows all three curves rising at an increas-
ing rate. For example, a 50 percent reduction in
the tax rate (from 30 to 15 percent) would re-
sult in a 76 percent reduction in the excess bur-
den—from 0.62 to 0.15 percent. Based on a
F I G U R E 4
Response of Excess Burden 
to Changes in d
d
F I G U R E 5
Response of Excess Burden 
to Changes in t
t
F I G U R E 6
Response of Excess Burden
to Changes in r
r
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
(17) ¶s =  –  
(1 + r)(1 + rn)(r – rn) 
< 0.
¶d (1 + rn)2(r + d)2 
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GDP of $7,254 billion (its 1995 value), this
would amount to a gain of about $34 billion.
The size of the welfare loss is also sensitive
to the assumed rate of interest. Figure 6 shows
that the combined excess burden increases
from 0.62 percent to 0.99 percent when r is
raised by just 100 basis points from its base-
case value of 3 percent. 
Neutralizing the
Static Distortion
As mentioned earlier, ignoring the static distor-
tion would result in substantial underestimation
of the welfare loss from a capital income tax.
Taking GDP at its 1995 value of $7,254 billion,
the total welfare loss from a capital income tax
under our base-case parameters is estimated at
$45 billion annually. The implicit subsidy to
durable goods consumption induces a higher
lifetime consumption of durables and a lower
consumption of nondurables. Under our base-
case parameters, we estimate that the demand
for holding durable-goods stocks rises by 3.4
percent and the demand for nondurables
declines by 7.5 percent.
It follows, then, that eliminating the capital
income tax would be a desirable goal for tax
reform. Indeed, this is the motivation of recent
proposals for replacing the income tax with a
flat tax on wages. The flat-tax proposals have
been criticized, however, because of their likely
impact on equity. If such objections make elim-
inating the capital income tax infeasible, our
analysis suggests that it may nevertheless be
possible to reduce or eliminate the static com-
ponent of the welfare loss. This could be done
by imposing a tax on the purchase of durable
goods. The appropriate rate of taxation can be
calculated as m = 1 – (q/qn). Under our base-
case parameters, the rate of additional tax on
durables purchases turns out to be about 11.7
percent. This would reduce the welfare loss by
about $9 billion annually.
VII. Conclusion
Our theoretical analysis shows how the total
excess burden from a capital income tax can be
decomposed into its static and intertemporal
parts by using a CES utility specification. Under
this specification, the sum of the static and
intertemporal components closely approxi-
mates the combined excess burden. We also
show that the static component of the excess
burden arising from capital income taxation
may be sizable. Under reasonable assumptions
about elasticities of substitution and other para-
meters, ignoring this source of distortion causes
an underestimation of the welfare loss by as
much as 26 percent.
Furthermore, our analysis indicates that the
static distortion caused by capital income taxa-
tion can be substantial for major durable goods
such as housing, which have relatively low
rates of depreciation. The total distortion from
the capital income tax is estimated to be $45
billion annually. Shifting from the income tax to
a flat-tax system would eliminate this welfare
loss. However, if such a reform is infeasible
because of equity or other reasons, it may be
desirable to impose a tax on the purchase of
durable goods, thereby eliminating the static
component of excess burden. 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/review/
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